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  Portugal has been a consolidated democracy since the mid-1980s. Elections are 
free and fair, political rights are protected both de jure and de facto, there is media 
pluralism and freedom and the judicial system is independent. The legal basis and 
practical functioning of the democratic system are evident. However, while the 
formal aspects of Portugal’s democracy are not in question, there is substantial 
and growing public dissatisfaction with its performance. Portugal also falls short 
in terms of sustainable policy performance and of governance capacity.  
 
The problematic overall situation is probably best illustrated by the Accord 
Portugal signed with the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF 
on 17 May 2011, which threw the de facto sovereignty of the country into 
question. Signed by outgoing Prime Minister José Socrates, it was supported by 
political parties that had received 85% of the popular vote on 5 June 2011 in the 
Assembly of the Republic and came into effect on 21 June 2011. The current 
government of Prime Minister Passos Coelho was committed to implementing the 
terms of the Accord in the June 2011 government program. There are currently at 
least five problem areas: 
 
• Sustainability of public finances. Portugal has faced major difficulties in meeting 
its eurozone obligations in terms of budgetary consolidation in the new 
millennium. 
 
• Economic growth. Portugal’s economy saw a period of considerable growth until 
the beginning of the new millennium. This may help explain Portugal’s 
difficulties in meeting its eurozone obligations, as it has sought to curtail 
expenditure and raise revenue in a heavily countercyclical manner. 
 
• Socioeconomic inequalities. These are as much a cause as a consequence of poor 
economic growth. Portugal is one of the most unequal societies in the European 
Union. This is largely explained by the generally very low and very unequal levels 
of educational attainment. Weak economic growth in Portugal is a reflection of 
low productivity levels in the country. 
 





• The huge challenge of converting legislation into actual public policy. The 
Portuguese political system does produce legislation to deal with problems. 
However, the implementation of these measures often falls short of the intentions. 
 
• A very formalistic and slow legal system, with decisions often taking years. This 
not only corrodes citizens’ trust in the judicial system, but also weakens the rule of 
law. 
 
With regard to policy performance, the primary focus of public policy in the 
period analyzed has been on raising public revenue and reducing public 
expenditure in order to meet the budget deficit goals set out in the Troika’s 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This means that other objectives, such as 
dealing with environmental issues or socioeconomic inequalities or increasing 
public administration efficiency and efficacy, receive comparatively little attention 
and are secondary to the budgetary goals. 
 
While austerity measures are expected to yield future gains for Portugal, the 
policies so far enacted do not ensure long-term sustainability of cuts in public 
expenditure. In its 2012 budget, the government cut public sector wages and 
pensions by 14.3% – a cut that was later deemed unconstitutional (but was 
temporarily permitted for the year of 2012) by the Constitutional Court. In its 
2013 budget, the government again placed a large part of its public expenditure 
cuts in a similar (albeit smaller 7.1%) wage and pension cut, which was again 
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.  
 
The incapacity to formulate and implement sustainable policies has been 
exacerbated by growing opposition to austerity measures. Indeed, the main 
opposition party, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), which was in office 
when the MoU was signed, broke with the government’s austerity plan in late 
2012. In addition, there have been massive demonstrations against the austerity 
measures, one of the largest being the 15 September 2012 demonstration. These 
protests reflect a broader and deepening mistrust of political actors that further 
weakens the steering capacity of governance. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the country faces a deep economic recession, which 
cannot be dissociated from these patterns. This recession has most notably 
percolated through to a very fast rise in unemployment, reaching 17.8% in April 
2013 from 12.6% in May 2011. Unemployment is now more than four times 
higher than in early 2002 (4.3%), which also helps explains the decline in 
satisfaction with democracy over the past decade. 







  When the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in May 2011, it was 
welcomed by many as the necessary impetus for much-needed and oft-delayed 
reforms in Portugal. Indeed, the MoU garnered widespread political and public 
support. Politically, the MoU was approved by the three parties that have 
monopolized government in democratic Portugal, the Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social Democrata, PSD), Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) and the 
Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democrático e Social, CDS). Together, 
these parties garnered 78.4% of the vote in the June 2011 legislative elections, 
while the anti-Troika parties – the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Português, PCP) and the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE) – yielded 
their worst results in nearly a decade.  
 
Portugal faced considerable challenges in May 2013. Its economy had been 
stalling, with GDP declining 1.6% in 2011 and 3.2% in 2012, and the 
government’s figures predicted a further 2.3% fall in 2013. Unemployment had 
increased to 17.8% – an unprecedented record since democratization. Public 
accounts remained far from sustainable, with a 6.6% budget deficit in 2012, and 
with government debt rising to 127.3% of GDP by March 2013, more than 30 
percentage points higher than in 2010 (94%). 
 
Two years on, the scenario is very different. The political consensus has all but 
eroded. The opposition PS distanced itself from the PSD–CDS coalition austerity 
measures; unions and employers’ associations have increasingly expressed their 
misgivings and dissatisfaction with policy options; and the coalition itself has 
shown increasingly public signs of internal strife. Citizen dissatisfaction with the 
MoU has also mounted, with a poll in May 2013 indicating that only 11% still 
agreed with the MoU, as opposed to 41% who felt it should be renegotiated and 
41.5% who said Portugal should withdraw from it. This declining political and 
public consensus is of relevance when the government is planning to concentrate 
the central part of its reform of the state in 2014 with cuts of €4.7 billion. 
 
This swift change in the political and public mood cannot be dissociated from the 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions of austerity. Moreover, this austerity 
has so far largely failed to reach its intended goals – a pattern reflected in 
successive revisions to the MoU budget deficit targets. Within this context – 
namely a free-falling economy that aggravates public accounts, deep mistrust in 





politicians and seemingly evaporated public and political consensus – suggestions 
for confronting and handling these central problems are far from straightforward. 
Nevertheless, there are three key areas that might help overcome the seemingly 
intractable challenges Portugal now faces:  
 
1. Europe: while Portugal’s problems have a national dimension, they also reflect 
a wider European challenge. In this regard, Portugal would do well to actively 
engage in seeking European-level solutions and consensus. While Portugal is a 
peripheral country, it has accumulated capital as a “good European” and it should 
seek a more active role at EU level. Naturally any solution will require broad 
consensus, not least from the more powerful member states, but that does not 
mean that Portugal should withdraw from the debate. By all accounts, there is 
considerable scope for greater engagement at EU level for Portugal.  
 
2. Re-establish consensus: Portugal undoubtedly faces an enormous challenge and 
has little time to deliver, as the current bailout ends in mid-2014. Nevertheless, 
implementing the required long-term reforms will be difficult, if not impossible, 
without wide political and public support. In particular, the government will need 
to engage with four other actors to generate wider consensus: the main opposition 
party, PS; the social partners; citizens; and last but not least, the Troika. In this 
process of re-establishing consensus, all actors must be willing to concede some of 
their preferences and see others adopted – something that appears to be 
increasingly lacking from debate in the last two years.  
 
3. Improve governance capacity: Portugal scores poorly in a number of categories, 
such as the weak usage of evidence-based instruments in policymaking; lack of 
strategic planning and input in policy; weak societal consultation; weak policy 
implementation; and little reflection on institutional arrangements of governing. 
Inevitably, these impinge on the quality of policy, both in terms of its conception 
and implementation. Indeed, they are a central component in explaining how 
Portugal reached the point it did in 2011. While Portugal has little time and faces 
considerable challenges in terms of getting public accounts in order and 
responding to the MoU, without additional governance capacity the measures 
adopted are likely to be less effective and less sustainable.  
 
If the PSD–CDS-based government can hold until the next scheduled elections in 
2014, and if the members of the Troika can exercise some degree of flexibility, 
then Portugal’s impressive democratic consolidation can be matched by social and 
economic reforms commensurate with the country’s leadership in the move from 
dictatorship to democracy. 







 Policy Performance 
 






 The period under analysis coincides with the bailout of Portugal by the EC–
ECB–IMF Troika. The measures negotiated by the Portuguese government, 
both at the outset of the bailout and as time has progressed, are inevitably 
constrained by the terms set out by the country’s international lenders and by 
the overall goal of achieving sustainability in Portugal’s public accounts.  
 
This has inevitably had an impact on economic policy, which has essentially 
played a secondary role to the overall goal of reducing public expenditure, 
increasing public revenue and implementing reforms negotiated with the 
Troika. 
  
The austerity measures of period 2011 – 2013 have percolated through to a 
substantial economic recession. GDP declined 1.6% in 2011, 3.2% in 2012 and 
is expected to decline a further 2.3% in 2013. 
  
Within this backdrop, the only positive note is the improvement in the balance 
of trade and the increase in exports, although this has not been enough to 
generate economic growth or avoid growing unemployment. The Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) that Portugal signed with the Troika aimed to foster 
“the reallocation of resources towards the tradable sector,” with exports 
becoming the main engine of growth, rather than remaining the protected non-
tradable sector of the previous decade. The government has sought to 
encourage exports, and this appears to have been achieved to some extent, with 
Portugal’s trade balance – chronically in deficit – generating a surplus in 2012 
for the first time since 1943. 











Labor Market Policy 
Score: 4 
 Unemployment has increased very quickly over the last two years, reaching 
17.8% in April 2013, over five percentage points higher than the 12.6% of May 
2011. As a result of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and of the 
government’s austerity measures, the government approved new labor 
legislation in May 2012 that considerably increases labor market flexibility, 
while unemployment benefits have been further cut. However, these measures 
have been insufficient to compensate for the fast falling economy as domestic 
demand collapsed. Indeed, it must be noted that the government’s 2013 budget 
forecast of 16.4% unemployment in the current year has already been surpassed 






 Portugal is ranked by foreign investors as one of the least competitive countries 
in Europe, and private investment has been decreasing since 2003. The most 
recent Global Competitiveness Index ranks Portugal at 49, above only Greece 
(96th) in western Europe, and below Spain (36th) and Italy (42nd). In 2011 it 
was ranked 45th. 
  
Taxes have increased considerably as a result of the country’s attempts to 
achieve balanced public accounts in the 2011 – 2013 period. The 2013 budget 
included a tax increase that was publicly described by the country’s finance 
minister, Vítor Gaspar, as being “enormous.” Overall, some 80% of the 
consolidation in the 2013 budget is to be achieved from the revenue side – a 
significant departure from the original plan for the adjustment to be achieved 
by cutting expenditure (two thirds) and raising revenues (one third). 
  
In a recession context, tax receipts are not increasing as much as the rising tax 
rates would suggest, with high budget deficits suggesting that public receipts 
fall well short of public expenditure. Similarly, tax policy falls short of the goal 
of horizontal and vertical equity. There continues to be widespread tax 
avoidance in the realm of personal income tax, placing a tax burden mostly on 
employees. At corporate level, studies indicate that the effective tax rate is 





often lower for more profitable companies. The insufficient revenue from 
corporate and personal income taxes leads to a greater dependence on indirect 










 In theory, taxes should be sufficient. However, three of the four posited goals 
have not been achieved. This situation is in part due to high costs of public 
administration with an elevated number of civil servants (578,384 out of 
3,827,000 total employed persons in the last quarter of 2009) and the fact that 
public companies lose money. The taxes are not sufficient to cover the costs of 
public expenditure, especially as the economic recession had a negative impact 
on tax receipts while increasing public welfare expenditure.  
 
The initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stipulated the goal of 
“Reduc[ing] the government deficit to below €10,068 million (equivalent to 
5.9% of GDP based on current projections) in 2011, €7,645 million (4.5% of 
GDP) in 2012 and €5,224 million (3.0% of GDP) in 2013.” However, these 
targets have been altered twice already. Thus the 2012 budget deficit was 
revised to 5% in September 2012. In March 2013, the targets were further 
changed to 5.5% budget deficit in 2013, 4% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. These 
revisions reflect the inability to reach the original targets, with the official 
budget deficit reaching 6.4% in 2012. 
  
Research and Innovation 
R&I Policy 
Score: 4 
 Research and innovation policy partly supports innovations that foster the 
creation of new products and enhances productivity. There is a policy to 
support research and innovation – backed by the European Union and the 
Portuguese government – that functions in universities and in businesses, and 
in some research centers which are linked to businesses and universities. These 
include: Aveiro University, Faculty of Medicine at Coimbra University, 
Faculty of Engineering at Porto University, Advanced Technical Institute of 
Lisbon, New University of Lisbon at Costa da Caparica, University of the 
Algarve, University of Minho, etc. There is not, however, a formulated policy 
to create new products to increase productivity. Moreover, the austerity 
measures have also had an adverse impact on support for research and 





innovation, curtailing public funding – the main source of investment on R&D 
– substantially. The economic recession has also had an adverse impact on 
private investment in R&D. Indeed, the European Union’s Innovation Union 
Scoreboard shows that Portugal’s innovation index declined by 4.9% between 
2010 and 2012, contrasting with the overall EU increase of 2.4%. 
 
Citation:  
(1) European Union,“Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013” 
 
  




 In terms of the Memorandum of Understanding with the EC–ECB–IMF Troika, 
Portugal is in the process of restructuring its financial markets. 
 





 The government of Passos Coelho that took office in June 2011 abolished the 
“New Opportunities” program of lifelong learning that had been a flagship of 
his predecessor’s executive. The New Opportunities centers were replaced in 
March 2013. The government has also sought to favor technical and 
professional education more strongly, and increase national-level examinations 
for students. However, there is little evidence that these have generated gains in 
terms quality, access or efficiency.  
  
With regard to quality, the austerity measures and cuts have had an adverse 
impact on the already poor median quality of education in Portugal, with 
schools and universities seeing their budgets slashed. Schools have lost 
teachers, with those leaving being defined not on their quality but rather on the 
nature of their contract. Universities have also seen some brain drain as a result 
of lower budgets and reductions in wages.  
 
Similarly, access has been affected, both on the supply and demand sides. On 
the supply side, the cuts have sustained existing bottlenecks (e.g., in pre-
schooling). The demand side has been constrained by the recession – with 
increasing unemployment and lower family incomes – and austerity, with 
higher tuition fees and more limited financial aid for poorer students.  






While the number of university graduates has increased, Portugal remains far 
below the OECD average. Likewise, the high school dropout is very high. 






 There are government social policies that seek to limit socioeconomic 
disparities, but they are poorly funded and do not prevent poverty effectively. 
Taxes were first imposed and then increased on pensions, which are taxed as 
though they are income. The government is seeking to improve the social 
situation through laws and programs but rising unemployment increases social 
inequalities. Also, in view of the need to reduce social costs of the government, 






 Portugal’s population shows comparatively good levels of overall health. Life 
expectancy has continued to grow, and in 2011 surpassed the EU average for 
the first time for males (77.6 years versus an 77.4 EU average), and for the first 
time since 2005 for females (84 years versus an 83.2 EU average). Infant 
mortality also diminished, and remains lower than that of Denmark, Germany, 
France or the Netherlands. 
  
Portugal has a universal and general National Health Service (NHS), accessible 
to all residents. This has come under particular financial pressure as a result of 
the pressure on Portugal to curb public expenditure. Health expenditure has 
been considerably cut and the costs levied for using the NHS have increased – 
more than doubling in 2012. These higher costs – with an emergency room 
visit now costing €20 or almost 5% of the net monthly minimum wage – 
appears to have an adverse impact on inclusiveness, as they may price out some 
poorer users. 
 
Overall, Portugal presents a cost efficient health system. It has successfully cut 
health expenditure further in the last two years, albeit at the cost of 
inclusiveness and, to a lesser extent, of quality. 
 
Citation:  
(1) Eurostat data -“Life expectancy at birth, by sex” 
 









 There is little change on family policy per se in this period. The rules 
concerning maternity leave remain virtually unchanged, although there was a 
reduction of up to 14% in the amount of the maternity subsidy implemented by 
the government from July 2012 onwards – again, a reflection of the austerity 
and public expenditure cuts that were implemented. However, this largely 
unchanged policy now interacts with a far less favorable context, with the birth 
rate in 2012 the lowest on record at some 10%–20% lower than in 2011. This 
cannot be dissociated from the economic recession and rising unemployment, 
which has had an adverse impact on the country’s already low fertility rate, and 
reflects the few opportunities there are for women to combine parenting and 
work. In this context – and with the current birth rate well below the level 
necessary to maintain Portugal’s population – more proactive policies are 
clearly needed.  
 
There are some new programs but they appear insufficient. Beginning in 
February 2012, parents with children below the age of 12, or with chronic 
illnesses, could request flexible work schedules. After the expiry of mothers’ 
child care leave,employers are required to provide for retraining programs. 
Women can spend more time at home with children on parental leave – and 
fathers can take over from mothers. The parental leave period is 120 days at 





 Pensions policy has been one of the most scrutinized aspects of Portugal’s 2011 
bailout, and has been one of the domains in which the government has sought 
to reduce public expenditure. To that end, a number of cuts and measures have 
been enacted. A 2013 study indicated that on average the government has saved 
more than €2.5 billion on pensions since 2011, reducing each pensioner’s 
income by an average of €733. 
  
While these cuts have hit the highest pensions especially hard, they have also 
affected poorer pensioners – damaging the goal of preventing poverty among 
the elderly. A study indicated that in 2010 – 2011 three out four pensioners in 
Portugal received a pension of €500 or less, and that the risk of poverty among 
the elderly is higher in Portugal than elsewhere in the European Union. This 
effect is likely to be aggravated, as cuts in pensions were compounded by the 
recession and rising unemployment, which weakened overall family income.  






The government has sought to reinforce the fiscal stability of the pension 
system. To that end, the age of retirement is planned to increase from 65 to 67 
years (although as of May 2013 that had not yet been implemented), and the 
government has also reduced future public sector pensions. Nevertheless, this 
stability was made difficult by the diminishing population – as both birth rates 
and immigration fell – and by the economic recession and unemployment, 
which inevitably reduce social security revenue.  
 
The current pensions system does not appear to ensure intergenerational equity. 
While the government has maintained this as a goal of its reforms, there is little 
or no evidence of this being achieved. 
 
Citation:  
(1) Erika Nunes,“Estado já retirou 733 euros a cada reformado desde 2011”, Dinheiro Vivo, Maio 2013.  







 The economic crisis has seen a decrease in immigration, both in terms of the 
influx of immigrants and in the stock of immigrants residing in the country. In 
2012 the total number of immigrants according to the country’s Borders and 
Foreigners Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, SEF) stood at 
417,042 – a 4.5% drop on 2011. 
 
This decline has taken some of the pressure off of programs targeting 
integration. The Portuguese government runs an integration program via the 
Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural but with the 
economic crisis and the reduction in the influx of immigrants, focus on the 
issue has diminished. There are, in addition to public programs, some private 
programs sponsored by NGOs, such as Portuguese language lessons and skill 
training. The Gulbenkian Foundation also sponsors programs for doctors.  
 
That said, Portugal’s integration policies remain very favorable and generally 
successful. Indeed, the latest Mipex (Migrant Integration Policy Index) report 
of 2011 gave Portugal the second best overall integration policies of the 31 
countries considered (EU-27 plus Canada, United States, Norway and 
Switzerland), with a score of 79 – substantially higher than the EU-27 average 
(52) and lower only than Sweden (83). 
 






(1) Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (2013).“Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo - 2012”, p. 9  







 Portugal is signatory to and participant in all of the relevant Europe-wide 
programs regarding public security.  
 
Despite the economic crisis and rising unemployment, crime has not risen in 
the period under analysis. Indeed, the 2012 National Internal Security report 
indicates a drop in overall criminality – particularly violent and serious crime. 
Portugal remains a relatively safe country in international terms, especially 
with regard to violent and serious crime, although this is less true of burglaries 
and petty theft. The most recent data (2010) showed Portugal having the 5th 
highest rate in the OECD of burglaries per 100,000 population according to the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Statistics on Crime, Sexual Violence. 
  
While the economic crisis has not seen an overall increase in crime, new forms 
of criminality have emerged, possibly initiated by the recession. One such 
instance is the stealing of non-valuable metals, such as copper from internet 
and phone cables, metals from public artworks (e.g., bronze statues), or of 
public railings and sewage covers made of metal. This type of crime has gained 
some media salience, and the 2012 National Internal Security report indicates 
there were 15,172 instances in 2012. 
 
Citation:  
(1) Sistema de Segurança Interna,“Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna 2012”  
(2) Nick Cowen & Nigel Williams / Civitas (2012),“Comparisons of Crime in OECD Countries”, p. 5  




Global Social Policy 
Score: 5 
 In the period under analysis, foreign aid has been very much a secondary 
consideration in foreign policy, with the main interest being in economic 
diplomacy to promote the Portuguese economy and exports. That does not 
mean that Portugal is disengaged – it still participates well in terms of foreign 
aid, especially in the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa and East Timor. 
However, while there was funding for foreign aid projects, there was little 
concern with the overarching aid policy, which means that coherence was not 
as strong as it might be. This lack of interest also percolates through to the 





design of international policies and the lack of international leadership in that 
regard.  
 
It must also be kept in mind that Portugal is a follower, and not an international 
leader, and has very few resources. Therefore, while Portugal is supportive of 
the good intentions, it is in fact marginal to their implementation and design. 
 






 There is legislation to protect the environment. However, once again, the 
current government is so focused on hard economic realities that in the overall 
scale of things, the environment is not considered a political priority. And 
although the government has failed to implement adequate policies to mitigate 
climate change, ensure renewable water sources, and protect forest areas and 
biodiversity, the reduction in production resulting from the economic crisis has 
eased the pressures placed on the environment. 
  





 Portugal agrees to and participates in EU-wide policies on the environment. 
Portugal has also signed the Kyoto Protocol. It agrees and participates in this 
legislation, but the main issue concerns implementation in both the domestic 
and global settings. 
 














 Individuals and political parties enjoy largely equal opportunities to register for 
and to run in elections, both de jure and de facto. Parties espousing racist, 
fascist or regionalist values are all constitutionally prohibited, as are parties 
whose names are directly related to specific religious communities. However, 
these rules are rarely applied, and the small, extreme-right National Renewal 
Party (Partido Nacional Renovador, PNR) was allowed to contest the June 
2011 legislative elections. 
  
While independent citizens can run in municipal elections, they are barred from 
contesting legislative elections, where only registered political parties can 
present candidates. The requirements for registering a party are relatively 
onerous. To be formed, parties require the legally verified signatures of 7,500 
voters. Moreover, they must ensure that their internal party rules and statutes 
conform to the political party law, which requires that parties’ internal 
functioning must conform to “the principles of democratic organization and 
management” (Article 5 of the Political Party Law – Lei dos Partidos Políticos) 
and defines a number of internal bodies that parties must have (Articles 24–27).  
 
These requirements do not generally prevent new parties from forming. Thus, 
the June 2011 legislative elections saw a total of 17 parties running – one more 
than the preceding 2009 elections. However, in March 2013, the registration of 
the Socialist Alternative Movement (Movimento Alternativa Socialista, MAS), 
a splinter of the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE), as a political party was 
refused by the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that its statutes did not 
adequately ensure the principles of democratic organization, management and 
legal oversight. This decision was contested by the head of the Portuguese 
Lawyers’ Order. After an appeal by MAS was rejected by the Court in late 
April 2013, the putative party announced that it would submit a new 
application to the Constitutional Court to be registered as a political party. 
 






On the laws see, for example, Eleição da Assembleia da República 1 / Outubro/1995: Legislação eleitoral 
actualizada e anotada (Lisbon: STAPE/MAI, 1995); and Lei dos Partidos Políticos (Political Party Law) – 





 Parties have access to broadcast time on television and radio for political 
purposes during the official campaign period of two weeks preceding the 
election date. This time is divided equally among the parties, according to the 
number of candidates they present. Parties need to present lists in at least 25% 
of electoral districts, and field a total number of candidates equal to at least 
one-quarter of the total number of possible candidates, in order to qualify for 
these broadcasts. However, despite airing during prime time, these short 
broadcasts (lasting a maximum of three minutes for each party) do not attract 
much of an audience. Thus, in the 5 June 2011 legislative elections, none of the 
party political broadcasts were in the top 15 most-watched television programs 
of May or June.  
 
If one considers media access more broadly, access to news programs and 
political debates is overwhelmingly concentrated on the five parties that have 
parliamentary representation: the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), the 
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD), the Democratic and 
Social Center People’s Party (Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular, 
CDS-PP), the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE) and the Democratic Unitarian 
Coalition (Coligação Democrática Unitária between the Portuguese Communist 
Party and the Ecologist Party, CDU). Thus, television news coverage, which is 
popular in terms of TV ratings, and is the predominant source of information 
for the Portuguese, is heavily concentrated on the five main parties.  
 
With regard to political debates, for the 2011 legislative elections, a total of 10 
debates took place between the leaders of these main parties, with each debate 
featuring two leaders. These debates drew considerable attention: the 10 
debates had an average audience of 1,081,795 viewers, with the least popular 
debate being watched by more than 887,000 spectators and the most popular 
one drawing over 1.5 million viewers (ranking as the 7th most viewed TV 
program of May 2011). The issue of the political debates and of the unequal 
treatment of minor parties was a thorny issue in the 2011 election campaign. A 
number of the minor parties protested against the allegedly unequal treatment 
they received in terms of participation in political debates. Members of some 
smaller parties forced entry into the Portuguese public broadcaster in protest at 
their exclusion from the debates on 5 May 2011.  
 





Two of these smaller parties also contested their exclusion from political 
debates in the legal system. The court that was petitioned ruled in their favor, 
mandating the television broadcasters to feature them in one-on-one debates 
with all political parties that accepted these debates. In practice, however, the 
court ruling failed to achieve full parity for these smaller parties, as the 
majority of the larger parties refused to participate in the court-mandated 
debates and television broadcasters responded to the court ruling by 
broadcasting shorter, 20-minute debates (less than half of the 45 minute to one 




 All adult citizens are guaranteed the right to participate in national elections. 
The government also provides transportation to those requiring it. Citizens in 
hospitals and in jails are also able to vote, and assisted as necessary, and 
Portuguese citizens living abroad can also vote. There is no observable 
discrimination.  
 
Problems with substantial inflation of the electoral register remain. Comparing 
2011 census data with the same year’s electoral register, the latter outnumbers 
the former by just over 1 million voters, thus artificially inflating abstention 
rates by some 10 percentage points. 
 
Much of this discrepancy appears to be due to Portuguese emigrants who are 
registered in Portugal but do not transfer their electoral registration to their 
overseas residence. As Portuguese voters can only vote in the administrative 
parish (or, if abroad, in the country) in which they are formally registered, this 
means that a substantial proportion of Portuguese emigrants are unable to 
exercise their voting rights. January 2013 data from the Internal Affairs 
Ministry indicated that in Luanda, Angola, there were 2,000 Portuguese voters 
on the official electoral register for Angola – a small fraction of the estimated 
100,000 Portuguese immigrants to the Angolan capital. 
  
At the same time, it must be noted that this discrepancy is not due to legal 
barriers to registration. Both within and without Portugal, electoral registration 
is a simple and non-exclusionary process. 
Party Financing 
Score: 7 
 Political party funding oversight lies with the Constitutional Court, which has a 
specific body to monitor party financing and accounts – the Entidade das 
Contas e Financiamentos Políticos (ECFP). There are two main sources of 
funds for political parties. Firstly, from the government, for all parties that 
received votes above a certain threshold in previous elections (over 100,000 
votes in the case of legislative elections); secondly, private contributions to the 
parties, which must be registered with the electoral commissions of each of the 
parties, from local, to regional, and finally to national levels.  






Parties’ annual accounts and separate electoral campaign accounts are 
published on the ECFP website and are scrutinized by this entity. At the time of 
writing, assessments of the 2011 election campaign accounts have not yet been 
published. However, taking into account previous experience, we can conclude 
that there remains scope for irregularities in party financing and campaign 
financing.  
  
While irregularities are assessed, this assessment takes place long after 
infractions are committed. For instance, the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the 
2008 party accounts was only pronounced in September 2011, and the Court’s 
evaluation of the 2009 legislative election campaign accounts only took place 
in July 2012. Moreover, the sanctions for infractions are relatively small and 
infrequent. A 2012 study on control of party accounts – based on interviews 
with both the ECFP and party representatives – noted that the ECFP lacked 









 The institution of referenda exists at national and local levels. However, while 
citizens can propose referenda – with 75,000 signatures required to subscribe a 
petition for a referendum – the referendum itself only takes place if there is 
agreement from political officeholders. In the case of national-level referenda, 
the Assembly of the Republic or the government must propose the referendum 
to the president, and the president accept this proposal. Citizens can propose 
local referenda, but the Municipal Assembly can decide whether to call these 
referenda or not.  
  
In practice, referenda are rare in Portugal. There have been only three national 
referenda in Portugal, the most recent in 2007. Local referenda are also rare, 
with five having taken place. There were two local referenda in the period 
under analysis (May 2011 – May 2013): one in the municipality of Cartaxo, on 
18 December 2011 and the other in the administrative parish of Milheirós de 
Poiares, on 16 September 2012. Participation was very low in both. In the 
latter, 1,773 voters participated (54% of the electorate); in the former, 2,629 
voters took part – a mere 12.6% of the total of electorate. 
 






Access to Information 
Media Freedom 
Score: 6 
 Public and private media are independent from the government’s influence, 
following the 1976 constitution. The media are regulated by the Entidade 
Reguladora da Comunicação Social (ERC). Four of the five members of the 
ERC board are appointed by a qualified majority of two thirds of the Assembly 
of the Republic, and the fifth member – who normally becomes the ERC’s head 
– is co-opted by the other four members.  
 
Despite a change in government in the aftermath of the June 2011 legislative 
elections, this period was also marked by alleged government interference with 
the media. The case involved Miguel Relvas, the minister for parliamentary 
affairs from the new center-right coalition between the Social Democratic Party 
(Partido Social Democrata, PSD) and the Democratic and Social Center 
People’s Party (Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular, CDS-PP). 
Miguel Relvas was alleged to have threatened a journalist from the leading 
daily newspaper Público in May 2012, in order to prevent her from pursuing an 
unfavorable story. Earlier in 2012, Miguel Relvas was also accused of 
censoring a radio opinion piece by the journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes that was 
critical of the Angolan regime . In both allegations, the ERC considered it did 
not have enough evidence to find the minister culpable of undue behavior.  
  
It should be noted that the Portuguese state owns the Rádio e Televisão de 
Portugal (RTP) Group, which has eight TV channels and eight radio stations. 
The board of this group is appointed by the government. As part of the 
Memorandum of Understanding’s (MoU’s) goal of reducing costs in state-
owned enterprises, the government considered various options vis-à-vis the 
RTP in 2012, with the public discussion of these options – including 
privatization of the main TV channel (RTP 1) or its concession to private 
operators – leading the (then) RTP board to resign in August 2012. The 
decision to privatize has been delayed, and the government says it will first 
restructure the media before attempting to sell RTP 1. Also, the government 
seeks to assert control over the public media, especially television and radio, in 
order to save money and reduce demands on public funds. It should also be 
noted that the government is the largest purchaser of advertising due to the 











 Portugal’s media market is a competitive and relatively diversified one. There 
are four main free-to-air terrestrial television networks – one public (RTP, with 
two channels) and two private (SIC and TVI), each of the latter owned by a 
different media conglomerate (Impresa and Media Capital). In the aftermath of 
the transition to digital television in 2012, the Portuguese Assembly’s own 
channel, ARTV (previously only available on cable), was added to the roster of 
free-to-air channels.  
  
The national cable television news channels, once restricted to offerings from 
the RTP and SIC groups, has been diversifying substantially since 2009. There 
are now five cable news channels in Portuguese, with SIC Notícias (founded in 
2001); RTP Informação (2004; named RTP Notícias until September 2011); 
TVI 24 (2009); Económico TV (2010; associated with the daily business 
newspaper, Diário Económico); and Correio da Manhã TV (March 2013, 
associated with the daily tabloid, Correio da Manhã).  
  
This diversification increasingly reflects the newspaper market, where a 
number of leading groups emerge. The Controlinveste group holds a number of 
relevant titles, notably Jornal de Notícias (a leading daily in northern Portugal) 
and Diário de Notícias (another leading daily newspaper). The Impresa group 
also controls some print outlets, its flagship being the influential Expresso 
weekly. Meanwhile, the Sonae group is behind another influential title – the 
daily Público. Cofina Media has the tabloid Correio da Manhã and the daily 
financial newspaper Jornal de Negócios; Ongoing has the other daily finance 
paper, Diário Económico; the daily “i” is owned by Sogapal; and the Sol 
weekly is held by Newshold.  
  
This diversity results in a degree of pluralism of views and opinions. At the 
same time, however, it must be noted that the majority of media outlets – 
notably newspapers – face considerable financial challenges, as they frequently 







 Free and readily available access to official information is guaranteed in Article 
48, 2 of the 1976 constitution, and there are mechanisms to ensure that this 
does in fact happen. There are extensive legal stipulations providing guarantees 
for access to official information. Additional support is supplied by the Aarhus 
Convention of the European Union which was signed on 25 July 1998 and 
ratified by Portugal on 7 September 2003. The government has recently put 
online virtually all official information and requirements such as permits and 
licenses. It can be readily accessed through home computers and for free in a 





wide variety of public places such as municipal libraries. The Commission on 
Access to Administrative Documents (Comissão de Acesso aos Documentos 
Administrativos, CADA) deals with complaints regarding public access to 
information. It was established in 1995. In short, most of the relevant 
information is available online, and is readily accessible to interested citizens 
and groups. 
  
Civil Rights and Political Liberties 
Civil Rights 
Score: 8 
 The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 defines broad categories of rights and 
guarantees for the population in Articles 12–23 and 24–27. This is generally 
also the case in practice. However, poorer elements of society, as in any 
country, tend to lack the educational, legal, and other means to take full 
advantage of these rights.  
 
Within this context, three elements of concern remain largely unchanged. 
  
(1) There continue to be reports of police violence and brutality. The 
government department responsible for investigating police brutality, the 
Inspecção-Geral da Administração Interna, received 913 complaints in 2011. 
The US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Portugal 
considers there to be “credible reports of excessive use of force by police.”  
 
(2) The treatment of prisoners remains another point of concern, with the US 
Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in Portugal identifying 
once again as “credible” reports of “abuse of prisoners by prison guards.” 
Moreover, this report quotes data from the Directorate General of Prison 
Services that, in 2011, the prison system was operating at 112% of capacity, 
clearly indicating overcrowding.  
 
(3) The legal system continues to effect lengthy pretrial “preventive” 
detentions, without charges being filed. According to the US Department of 
State Report on Human Rights Practices in Portugal, some 20% of the prison 
population was in preventive detention of this kind in 2011 – an increase (albeit 
a very slight one) from 19% in 2009. 
 
Citation:  
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 Under the regime that ruled Portugal until 1974, there were virtually no 
political liberties. The basic goal of the political transition was to achieve and 
to guarantee political liberties. Portugal has been successful in this regard, and 
there are widely agreed upon political liberties. The basic legislation in the 
constitution, and subsequent regular legislation, guarantees these political 
liberties. They function reasonably well. 
Non-discrimination 
Score: 8 
 State policies seek to redress discrimination, and cases of overt discrimination 
are rare. Nevertheless, areas of concern remain: 
 
- Discrimination against women in wages, with the gender pay gap increasing 
over recent years, from an unadjusted gender pay gap of 8.4% in 2006 to 12.5% 
in 2011. While this is below the EU average, the trend in Portugal contrasts 
with the decrease at EU level (17.7% in 2006 to 16.2% in 2011).  
 
- Legal sanctioning of racial discrimination: in 2013, the Portuguese 
government evaluated its existing legislation on racial discrimination and found 
it lacking in terms of the actual sanctioning of discrimination, with only seven 
condemnations for discrimination since 2005. The government noted a study 
that indicated that more than three in four people who felt discriminated against 
did not press charges, as the overwhelming majority felt that nothing would 
result from a formal complaint. Moreover, the government also noted a 2012 
report by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) that found Portugal to have a “subtle racism” that discriminates 
against people of African origin and causes inequality in access to education, 
public services and employment. This led the government to propose new 
legislation on racial discrimination in April 2013, which doubled the maximum 




Rule of Law 
Legal Certainty 
Score: 7 
 Portugal is an extremely legalistic society, and its legislation is prolix and 
complex. In combination with pressure for reform arising from Portugal’s 
bailout and economic crisis, this causes some uncertainty as to what legislation 
will be applied, and how. This is best exemplified by some of the legal 
measures that the government proposed in its 2012 and 2013 budgets, which 
were subsequently deemed to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
 
The Accord Portugal made with the EC–ECB–IMF Troika included a “reform 
of the state” to reduce social costs. Therefore, a number of what were legally 





predictable programs including in health, transport, and education, are very 
likely to change as their funds are cut. 
Judicial Review 
Score: 8 
 The judicial system is independent and it is very active in ensuring that the 
government conforms to the law. Indeed, 2011 – 2013 marked a high point of 
judicial intervention, with the Constitutional Court rejecting the key measures 
of the government’s budget in both 2012 and 2013 as unconstitutional. 
 
In addition to the Constitutional Court, there are a number of other courts. The 
highest body in the Portuguese judicial system is the Supreme Court, 
constituted by four Civil Chambers, two Criminal Chambers, and one Labor 
Chamber. There is also a Disputed Claims Chamber, which tries appeals filed 
against the decisions issued by the Higher Judicial Council. The Supreme Court 
determines appeals on matters of law and not on the facts of a case, and has a 
staff of 60 justices (Conselheiros). 
 
There is an attorney general, who, while nominated by the Assembly of the 
Republic, is fully independent. There are, however, some tensions, or different 
understandings, which raise questions regarding the level of independence and 
effectiveness of the judicial system. 
 
There are also district courts, appeal courts, and specialized courts plus a nine-
member Constitutional Court that reviews the constitutionality of legislation. In 
addition, there is the Court of Auditors. This is a constitutionally prescribed 
body, and is defined as a court in the Portuguese legal system. It audits public 
funds, public revenue, assets and expenditure to ensure that “the administration 
of those resources complies with the legal order.” The Court of Auditors is 
active in auditing and controlling public accounts. In total, there are more than 
500 courts in Portugal and 3,000 judges. Even so, there are shortages of judges 
in relationship to the number of cases and the delays in reaching judicial 




 The High Council of the Public Prosecution Department (Conselho Superior do 
Ministério Público), which oversees the appointment of judges, consists of 19 
members, including the attorney general. In October 2012, Portugal appointed 




 In law, abuse of position is prohibited and criminalized. However, corruption 
persists despite this legal framework. A 2012 assessment of the Portuguese 
Integrity System by the Portuguese branch of Transparency International 
concluded that the “political, cultural, social and economic climate in Portugal 
does not provide a solid ethical basis for the efficient fight against corruption,” 
and identified the political system and the enforcement system as the most 





fragile elements of the country’s integrity system. This assessment is 
corroborated by the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 
2012, which placed Portugal 33rd worldwide – one place lower than in 2011.  
 
A law was approved by the Assembly of the Republic in September 2011 on 
illicit enrichment of holders of public office. However, this legislation was 
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in April 2012. While 
practically all the parties that approved the legislation declared they would 
bring new legislation on this issue, as of May 2013 no new legislation had been 
approved.  
  
In December 2011, the government announced it would present an Ethics Code 
for Public Administration. However, by late April 2013 the document had not 
been approved and it was revealed that the government had decided to not 
adopt it, instead integrating the ethical issues into the reform of the 
administrative procedure code. 
 















 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Troika strictly limits 
opportunities for strategic planning. Inevitably, while there is strategic planning 
in finances and in the economy more generally, it is severely limited by the 
terms of the MoU and negotiations with Portugal’s international lenders. For 
example, there continue to be expert groups or offices consisting of 
government employees and outside experts formulating policies, like the 
Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento de Ministério do Ambiente, do 
Ordenamento do Território e Desenvolvimento Regional, Direcção Geral de 
Estudos, Estatística, e Planeamento (concerning employment) and the Gabinete 
de Estudos das Pescas. Most of the ministries have some kind of office or 
group for strategic planning. They occasionally exert some (limited) influence. 
However, under the current bailout, strategic planning is less evident than prior 
to the bailout. The MoU sets out a fairly definitive set of plans for the period of 
2011 – 2014, thus rendering other plans less relevant, while the need to achieve 
the budgetary consolidation goals has led to greater attention on reaching short-
term goals rather than long-term strategic planning. 
Scholarly Advice 
Score: 5 
 The government utilizes academic experts for research on a wide variety of 
topics and to implement strategic development. The use of academic experts is 
especially relevant in economic issues, but limited in its scope by the 





 The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy expertise. While it is 
able to assess bills, it lacks in-depth policy assessment capabilities for the 
various policy areas. With the bailout terms and with the achievement of the 
budgetary targets becoming paramount in 2011 – 2013, the assessment of 





policy has largely been centered on its budgetary implications, notably in terms 
of reducing costs and/or increasing revenue. To this end, the Ministry of 
Finance plays a more central role in the assessment of policy proposals, 
alongside the PMO. 
GO Gatekeeping 
Score: 9 
 The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is able to return proposed legislation on 
the basis of policy considerations. However, in the period of 2011 – 2013, its 
de facto power to return legislation is constrained by the terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This means that changes in measures 
in the MoU have to be negotiated with the EC–ECB–IMF Troika partners and 
cannot unilaterally be decided by the PMO. The priority given to budgetary 
consolidation means that the Ministry of Finance has seen its power increase, 
giving it also a de facto veto power over policy. 
Line Ministries 
Score: 7 
 The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly briefed on new developments 
affecting the preparation of policy proposals. 
Cabinet Committees 
Score: 6 
 Most ordinary meetings of the Portuguese cabinet – the Council of Ministers – 
are predominantly used for policy decisions rather than strategic policy 
debates. More political issues and strategic policy considerations are by-and-
large prepared by the Council’s inner core of a few ministers, augmented by 
other ministers and staff when required. However, as the economic crisis has 
deepened – and with a coalition government in office – the committee meetings 
are increasingly failing to settle all issues prior to Council meetings. This has 
led to some very long – and seemingly not entirely conclusive – Council of 




 Since the mid-1980s the practice has remained one of prior preparation of 
cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials, such as junior ministers or 
director generals (who are also political appointees), depending on the issue. 
Under the Memorandum of Understanding and with the existing budgetary 
constraints, this coordination is often carried out with the Ministry of Finance. 
The ministry keeps very close control over all expenditure. This reached its 
most extreme form for a period in April 2013, when any expense by a ministry 





 Informal coordination mechanisms are central to government functioning and 
coordination. The horizontal informal links between ministries help 
compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal linkages.  
 
Informal coordination has become all the more relevant in the 2011 – 2013 
period, as the current government is composed of a coalition between two 
parties. The failures in informal coordination between the coalition partners led 
to the most substantial crisis in government during this period, notably in 





September 2012 over proposed changes to social security contributions. These 
failures in coordination led the two parties to create a Council for Coalition 
Coordination in the same month. However, this does not appear to have 





 The change in government appears to have undone the very tentative (and 
small) advances in the domain of RIA. There is little or no systematic and 
formalized RIA. Moreover, in some cases when impact assessments are 
supposedly carried out, their results are not publicly presented. For instance, 
when proposing controversial changes to the social security contribution 
system in September 2012, the minister of finance stated that an impact 
assessment of the measure carried out by the government showed this measure 
would increase employment by 1%, and exports by 1%–2% within two years. 
However, this report was never published or made publicly available, even 
when other studies were carried out by academics disproving these results, and 
the measure was ultimately withdrawn by the government later that same 
month. 
Quality of RIA 
Process 
Score: 1 
 As noted above, systematic and formalized RIA does not exist in Portugal. The 
assessments that take place largely fail. The participation of stakeholders does 
generally take place, albeit inconsistently and without always encompassing all 
relevant stakeholders. Impact assessment results are often not made publicly 
available, nor are they systematically communicated. And there are no quality 




 Sustainability checks are not integrated systematically into impact assessments. 
They may take place in some impact assessments but not in others, in a rather 
ad hoc fashion that depends on who is carrying out the impact assessment. The 
same is the case with regard to the indicators that sustainability draws on; and 






 The government has met with social partners, including unions and employers’ 
organizations, extensively. Initially it was able to obtain the support of these 
organizations (or of a significant proportion of them). This is best reflected in 
the 2012 labor reforms which gained the support of one of the two main union 
confederations, the General Union of Workers (União Geral de Trabalhadores, 
UGT). However, since mid-2012 there has been a gradual weakening of the 
government’s ability to generate support, not least as austerity measures have 





advanced further and the economic crisis deepened. As such, it has ended up 
largely alienating former partners. This was particularly evident in the 2012 
proposal to change social security contributions – which was universally 
rejected by both employers and unions. While the government still meets with 
social partners, by 2013 it appears to do so largely as a result of legal 






 The government has internal structures for communication. However, it is 
facing increasing challenges to achieving coherent and coordinated 
communication. The difficulty has been growing since mid-2012 as tensions 
have increased within the coalition, the economic crisis worsened and the 
austerity measures failed to fully achieve their budgetary consolidation goals. 
This lack of coordination is evident in terms of:  
 
- Proposals that are announced and then withdrawn or not implemented. 
 
- Publicized disagreements between ministers.  
 
In April 2013, the minister in charge of communication resigned. While the 
main cause of his resignation was not communication problems, he was heavily 
criticized – even within his own party – for failing to achieve coherent and 






 The XIX constitutional government that took office on 21 June 2011 in the 
aftermath of the 5 June legislative elections does have a governance program. 
However, the government has not been successful in implementing much of it 
so far. It includes policies regarding the environment, economic policy, 
unemployment, etc. The government is instead obliged to implement the 
policies that are in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as its first 
priority. 
 
The government has largely remained on track in implementing the measures 
in the MoU. The Troika’s fifth quarterly review of Portugal’s economic 
adjustment program from 28 August to 11 September was fairly positive, 
noting that the country’s program “remains broadly on track” and is “making 
progress, albeit against strong headwinds.” However, at the same time, the 
MoU measures have been more actively pursued in some areas than others. In 





March 2013, for instance, the IMF chief of mission stated that reforms in the 
energy and telecoms markets did not go as far as the international partners 
would have liked. 
 
Citation:  
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 The organization of and power relations in the parliamentary/cabinet system 
ensure that the government has incentives to implement its program. This is 
further reinforced by the stipulations of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) and the fact that Portugal is under a bailout.  
 
That said, the current government faces additional challenges as a result of 
being a coalition, and the internal divisions within the government have 
become increasingly salient since mid-2012. Moreover, the internal 
organization of the government appears to have made implementation more 
difficult. The government has only 11 ministries, leading to the aggregation of 
previously extant ministries into “super ministries”. It appears that these super 
ministries – in crucial domains such as economy, employment and environment 





 The current government is small, with 11 ministries, 32 secretaries of state and 
one undersecretary of state. The ministries are not independent of the prime 
minister. The prime minister is also assisted by the Presidência do Conselho 
dos Ministros. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can thus monitor 
implementation activities of all line ministries. However, the lack of in-depth 
policy capacity within the PMO constrains the overall degree of control. As a 
result of the bailout, the actual degree of control is also shared with Ministry of 
Finance in terms of financial control, and with the EC–ECB–IMF Troika, 
which undertakes trimestral reviews of the implementation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). While this increases overall 
monitoring, it also means that monitoring is stronger in some dimensions 
(notably those of interest to the Troika, like financial aspects) rather than 






 Portugal has seen a proliferation of quasi-autonomous nongovernmental 
organizations (QUANGOs) and other structures in addition to an already 
complex direct administrative structure since the 1990s. These structures were 
often left with little ex-post monitoring. However, in the context of the bailout 
and the need to reduce public expenditure, the government has taken far closer 





interest in the operation of both QUANGOs and the direct administration. 
However, this interest is fundamentally centered on financial and budgetary 
aspects rather than the implementation of policy per se. 
Task Funding 
Score: 6 
 Portugal continues to be one of the most centralized countries in western 
Europe, with autonomous self-governing areas solely in the insular regions of 
the Azores and Madeira. 308 municipalities represent the main subnational 
level of government. In 2011, Portugal continued to have one of the European 
Union’s lowest ratios of subnational public expenditure to GDP at 7%, 
considerably lower than the EU-27 average of 11.9%. The subnational sector 
has long been burdened with increasing debts. These reached a critical point in 
the 2011 – 2013. The most salient bailout was that of the Madeira regional 
government in late 2011, as a result of huge deficits in Madeira. Additionally, 
the government set up a bailout for indebted municipalities while at the same 
time tightening its control over local accounts in mid-2012. Overall – and as 
with other policy areas – the main focus in terms of subnational delegation is 




 Formally, the central government enables subnational governments to make 
full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to 
implementation.However, subnational governments do not have their own 
revenue stream, instead being dependent on central government transfers. This 
means that the central government generally has considerable control. This 
control has increased in 2011 – 2013 as the central government imposed its 
own conditionalities on the Madeira regional government and on municipalities 
that requested central government help. The same is true of those 
municipalities which did not seek a central government bailout, as the 
increasing tightening of financial expenditure cut funding for programs that 
involved partnerships between central and local government. 
National Standards 
Score: 6 
 National standards are largely uniformly applied, albeit as a result of the 
control and provision of most public services by the central government. There 
are, however, differences between municipalities in some services, such as 







 The European Union is extremely important to Portugal in all respects. Since 
joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has 
become an integral part of Europe with all the implications arising from 
integration into a huge variety of legal and organizational frameworks. While 
the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and 





regulations, it is increasingly adapting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal 
is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, a 
situation that can only increase with the current bailout, so the country has had 
to adapt its structures accordingly. The policies regarding the environment 




 Although Portugal is small and not very influential as a nation, it is a member 
of the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, the World Trade Organization, etc., in 
which organizations it works with other nations to develop policies. It also 
applies the policies of these international organizations domestically, at least in 
terms of passing laws, and when it comes to the European Union it seeks to 
fully implement them. In this view, the government is largely able to shape and 
implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes 
enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting 





 The overwhelming concern has been to apply the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and seek budgetary consolidation. This means that 
monitoring resources are primarily allocated to the implementation of measures 
in the MoU; demonstrating results to (and, when necessary, negotiating with) 
the international partners of the Troika; and monitoring public administration 
expenditure. There have been no substantial measures concerning monitoring 
of institutional arrangements over this period and there is little evidence of de 
facto monitoring of institutional arrangements of governing. What little occurs 
appears to be reactive to political crises or challenges. 
Institutional Reform 
Score: 6 
 There is no evidence of the government changing institutional arrangements to 
improve strategic capacity over the period 2011 – 2013. The dominant goal 
under the bailout has been to apply the measures of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the EC–ECB–IMF Troika and seek budgetary 
consolidation. The government has not had space to reconsider changing 
institutional arrangements and the changes that did take place, such as reducing 
the number of ministries to 11, appear to have had at best no impact on 
strategic capacity. 
 






 II. Executive Accountability 
  
Citizens’ Participatory Competence 
Policy Knowledge 
Score: 5 
 The economic recession and the bailout have increased citizens’ attention and 
interest in policy matters. However, this greater demand for policy knowledge 
does not appear to translate into a corresponding increase in actual knowledge, 
with policy knowledge remaining limited and unevenly distributed. The factors 
that limit citizens’ policy knowledge include: insufficient and partial 
explanation of policy by the government; partial and insufficient explanation of 
policy alternatives by the opposition; the media system tends to focus more on 
short-term issues and scandals than on in-depth policy analysis; presentation of 
policy in terms that tend to be exclusionary for most citizens; and a weak civil 
society that is unable to socialize and educate citizens on policy issues. 
  




 The Assembly of the Republic does have a robust committee structure and 
system composed of standing and ad hoc committees, as well as committees to 
assess implementation of Plano do Governo and Orçamento do Governo. 
Moreover, it can call members of the executive to explain issues and has some 
degree of autonomy in terms of its budget allocations. However, there remains 
a substantial lack of expert support staff. Members of the Assembly generally 
do not have their own staff, and there is little expert support they can rely on. 
As such, the Assembly’s capacity to monitor government activity is largely 




 The government is obliged to respond within 30 days to requests for 
information from the Assembly of the Republic. While there is no data on how 
it responds specifically to requests from parliamentary committees, delivery of 
information to requests from members of parliament can be untimely or 
incomplete. Thus, in the first legislative session of the XII legislature, from 20 
June 2011 to 25 July 2012, 6,525 questions and requisitions were made by 
MPs, of which 1,498 (23%) were unanswered. However, this appears to reflect 
a lack of institutional capacity to answer the questions rather than a deliberate 
attempt to conceal information from the Assembly. Moreover, it is likely that 
committee requests are answered more promptly and fully than those of 
individual MPs. 







(1) Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar, Assembleia da República,“Atividade Legislativa - XII 





 Ministers must be heard at least four times per legislative session in their 
corresponding committee. Additionally, committees can request ministers to be 
present for additional hearings. A committee request requires inter-party 
consensus. However, each parliamentary group may also unilaterally request 
ministerial hearings. These vary from one to five per session, depending on the 
size of the parliamentary group. Ministers accede to requests for their 
attendance at hearings. 
Summoning Experts 
Score: 8 
 Parliamentary committees are generally free to request the attendance of 




 In the XII legislature (which began in June 2012) there are 12 permanent 
committees, which matches the number of ministers in the current government. 
That is not to say there is a direct correspondence – indeed, some committees 
monitor more than one minister – but all of the ministries and ministers are 
monitored. It should also be noted that the Assembly of the Republic created a 
special committee – the Comissão Eventual para Acompanhamento das 
Medidas do Programa de Assistência Financeira a Portugal – specifically to 
monitor Portugal’s ongoing implementation of the terms of the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU). 
Audit Office 
Score: 4 
 The Tribunal de Contas or supreme audit office (SAO) is totally independent of 
the Assembly of the Republic and the executive. It is part of the judicial 
system, on an equal level with the rest of the judicial system. However, while 
not accountable to the Assembly, it must report to it regularly. 
Ombuds Office 
Score: 1 
 Portugal does not have a parliamentary ombudsman. There is however a 
judicial ombudsman (Provedor de Justiça), which is situated in the judicial 





 As a result of the increased interest in policy with the bailout, media reporting 
has improved somewhat. That said, analyses of government decisions fail to 
carry out systematic in-depth policy analysis. Moreover, policy analysis is 
carried out by expert commentators, with little or no journalistic work on 
policy issues.  
 
One interesting trend of 2011 – 2013 has been the increasing commentary time 
allotted to former politicians, especially on television – the main source of 





political information. An analysis in early May 2013 indicated that there were 
69 hours of political commentary per week on the four free-to-air channels and 
three main cable news channels. Of a total of some 97 regular commentators, 
60 of these were politicians. The current crop of commentators includes, for 
instance, the previous prime minister, José Sócrates, and the former leader of 
the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD), Manuela 
Ferreira Leite. This profusion of politician-commentators does not appear to 
contribute to greater policy analysis, not least as many of these commentators 
are engaged in a political career. 
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 Three parties met the 10% criteria in the 2011 legislative elections: Social 
Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD), Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista, PS) and Democratic and Social Center People’s Party (Centro 
Democrático e Social – Partido Popular, CDS-PP). In all three parties, national-
level decision-making is highly centralized around a small number of party 
leaders. 
  
In the case of the PS and PSD, both hold direct elections of their party 
leadership by party members and have congresses with delegates also elected 
by party members. However, with regard to policy issues and candidates other 
than the party leader, the rank-and-file members have little say. Instead, 
decisions are largely made by the party leadership, which – depending on the 
internal balance of power – may have to negotiate with the leaders of opposing 
internal factions.  
 
In the case of the CDS-PP, this degree of centralization is if anything stronger. 
It abandoned the direct elections of the party leader in 2011, has a smaller rank-
and-file base and weaker internal factions. This means that virtually all 
decisions are placed in the hands of the party leader. Indeed, the current party 
leader has led the party for 13 of the last 15 years. 
  
While only these three parties met the 10% criteria in the past legislative 
elections, one could also identify two other relevant parties in Portugal, the 
Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP) and the Left 
Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE). These are also marked by a high degree of 










 A few business-related organizations are capable of formulating relevant 
policies – notably employers’ associations and trade unions. However, their 
proposals tend to be reactive to government measures rather than being 
proactive in setting policy debate. This pattern of reactivity has if anything 
been reinforced in the current period. While both employers and trade unions 
have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with the austerity measures, there 






 In the context of the economic crisis and of the bailout, there has been a 
reduction in the impact of other associations. On the one hand, the fact that 
Portugal has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EC–
ECB–IMF Troika, which specifies a very clear set of policy proposals, has seen 
civil society movements with policy platforms practically disappear from 
dialogue. Additionally, the overwhelming focus on economic issues means that 
other established groups’ proposals now gain less visibility (e.g., the 
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